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Abstract 
 
 
Cocaine remains one of the most problematic drugs in today's world. It has been 
associated with numerous negative health effects, as well as drug-related violence and 
other undesirable impacts.  The "war on cocaine" encompasses a variety of measures 
to reduce its supply, but more knowledge is needed to conclude which measures are 
effective. This study researches the link between coca supply reduction and violence 
in Colombia. Is the reduction of coca plant increasing the level of violence in 
Colombia, or conversely, does less coca leaf mean less violence? This study analyses 
the data on coca cultivation, as well as homicide rates and kidnappings in 23 
Colombian departments between 2004 - 2011 using panel data analysis. The analysis 
found a weak and statistically insignificant relationship between the variables "area 
under coca cultivation" and two variables representing violence level, i.e. "homicide 
rate" and "kidnapping rate". Therefore, the study concludes that the supply reduction 
effort should not be presented as a tool to reduce the violence in coca growing 
regions. 
 
 
Keywords: Colombia, cocaine, supply reduction, effect of supply reduction on 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction to this thesis 
 
For centuries, drug consumption has been a controversial issue. Currently the legal 
drug business is a well-controlled area, however when it comes to the illicit drug 
trade, the situation is more serious. Only a few policies targeting the illegal business 
have been effective, resulting in a minor number of countries that have managed to 
achieve a significant reduction in drug consumption or production. 
 
This study looks into the issue of supply reduction, i.e. policies that focus in lowering 
the supply and availability of the drug. Cocaine is extracted from the leaves of the 
coca bush plant, which is currently cultivated solely in the Andean region. Taking into 
account the concentration of the cocaine supply in this area, the most prominent 
reduction methods are as follows: eradication, interdiction and alternative 
development. In particular this thesis aims to investigate the effect of supply reduction 
in Colombia on local levels of violence.  
 
The analysis found a weak relationship between the area under coca cultivation and 
the number of homicides and kidnappings. The analysis considered 3 different 
models. The best model (measured by its -2log likelihood value) was in all cases 
linear model with random slope and random intercept for each region. However most 
of the results were statistically insignificant, therefore the conclusion suggests that a 
decrease in violence may not be achieved through cocaine supply reduction programs 
only. The link is evidently very complex and more research needs to be undertaken in 
order to learn about the most efficient strategy. 
 
Disposition 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  The first chapter briefly introduces the study 
and presents the research aim and question. The second chapter will elaborate on the 
international drug control system, its development, as well as the history of cocaine 
and supply reduction programs. The third chapter presents the main theories, 
academic research, as well as policy-makers response relevant to the issue. The fourth 
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chapter will describe the concepts and data used for the analysis that is presented in 
chapter five. The final chapter will draw a final conclusion. 
 
1.2. Research aim and question 
 
The aim of this study is to research the link between reduction efforts in the cocaine 
supply market and violence levels in Colombia, a major cocaine producing country. 
According to the World Drug Report 2012, coca leaf cultivation in Colombia fell 
from 144 800 hectares in 2001 to about a third, 57 000 hectares in 2010, United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012). Concerning such a rapid decrease, there 
maybe an observable impact on violence levels in Colombia. 
 
Reduction in Colombian coca cultivation was achieved by means of intense aerial 
spraying, manual eradication, as well as alternative development programs and 
various law enforcement measures. In 2010 alone, an area of 145 000 hectares was 
fumigated or manually eradicated1. Net area affected by coca cultivation in Colombia 
in 2010 was 62 000 hectares (adjusted for small fields) and a large part of the area is 
now subject to law enforcement pressure. However, the report does not discuss 
potential consequences of such reduction efforts that may have a negative, or a 
positive impact on Colombia's violence levels. 
 
This study looks at the consequences that can be associated with cocaine supply 
reduction programs recently implemented in Colombia, particularly on violence. The 
study will focus on the relationship between coca reduction and local levels of 
homicide rates and kidnapping rates in Colombia. 
 
The relationship between cocaine supply and related violence is a well-established 
link. Colombian violent organisations are known to use cocaine profits to exert 
violent pressure to support their activities. Therefore, this study aims to investigate 
whether the violent groups respond to lowering coca-related income by increasing 
                                       
1 The number is higher then the total area where coca is being cultivated, as some 
areas need to be fumigated more than once. 
2 Estimated total income derived from cocaine industry in 2009 is 85 billion USD 
  
 
 3 
violence, or less profits from drugs weakens the capacity of armed organisations to 
violate. 
 
The research takes into account the effects on Colombia only. It abstracts from 
potential impact of supply reduction on the country of consumption, transition, or any 
other participating state. 
 
The research question serves the purpose to answer whether supply reduction 
programs in Colombia were beneficial to the country, or not, in terms of bringing 
down the violence. The research question is: "Can the reduction in coca cultivation be 
interpreted as successful in terms of stabilizing the security situation in Colombia?" 
 
2. Background 
 
The following chapter will present the current situation as well as historical 
developments in the area studied. At the beginning of this chapter, preconditions for 
emergence as well as benefits and negatives of the international drug control system 
will be discussed.  The second section will introduce the three main conventions 
making up today's international drug control system. Thirdly, brief history of cocaine 
and the economic characteristics, under which the cocaine market operates. The forth 
subchapter will discuss supply reduction efforts in general, while the last section will 
follow with a presentation of recent supply reduction programmes in Colombia. 
 
2.1. Emergence of International Drug Control System 
 
Addictive substances, such as opium, cannabis or coca, have been known of and 
consumed over centuries. By the end of the 19th century drug trade had grown into a 
global problem and the international drug control system begun to emerge. 
Nevertheless, until now the drug market remains a lucrative, but problematic industry.  
 
Two major trade and diplomatic disputes between China and the British Empire, 
called the Opium Wars, took place in the mid 19th century. Opium imports had 
devastating social and economic effects; resulted in currency outflow and in an 
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increasing number of opium addicts in some Asian countries, especially China. On 
the other side, many island countries and colonial powers derived large profits from 
the opium trade and were not willing to put any restrictions on the industry. The 
situation called for a solution that one country was not able to address by its own 
means. The first multilateral initiative to approach, the then already major global 
issue, was the Shanghai Commission. Four years later, in 1912, the first convention 
was signed in Hague and provided the foundations for an international drug control 
system.  
 
Already the first convention from Hague created a dispute over how to deal with 
negative impacts of drug abuse. Reducing opium cultivation, promoted strongly by 
the USA, was opposed by producing countries, such as the UK, Russia and Persia. As 
a result, the first international conventions did not require supply reduction measures, 
but only a control of production.  
 
Developments in the following years, especially the two world wars, overshadowed 
the drug issue. Little progress was made during this period. For instance, signatories 
of the Versailles Treaty were required to adhere to the Hague Convention, however, 
there was no significant event until 1961, when the Single Convention was signed. 
Within the following two decades the Convention on Psychotropic Substances in 
1971 and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances in 1988 were agreed on. These three agreements make up 
today's international drug control regime.  
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2008;b) considers the following 
achievements as a major successes of the international drug control system over its 
existence: (i) consensus on the drug control regime, (ii) development of normative 
instruments, (iii) establishment of international bodies, and (iv) curtailing of the licit 
drug trade. However the international drug control system produced some unintended 
consequences. These are (i) the creation of the black market, (ii) "policy 
displacement" driving resources away from other activities, especially public health, 
(iii) the "balloon effect" resulting in geographical movements of the drug problem, 
(iv) transitions of consumers to substances other than those under strict control and 
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(v) further marginalization of drug consumers, who often already come from 
marginalized groups of the society.  
 
Currently, the international drug control system works well in illicit drug 
manufacturing, but the unintended illicit production and trafficking is now making up 
most of the multibillion industry.2 
 
Opium prevalence has substantially fallen over the hundred years of the international 
drug control system's existence. Unfortunately, the statistics for cocaine are less 
positive. Whilst legal manufacture of cocaine fell by 98%, illicit production of the 
same rose rapidly. Cocaine use increased from less than 0.1 % to 0.24 % over the 
period and overall manufacture of cocaine increased dramatically from 15 ton in 1903 
to 994 tons in 2007, (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008;b). Whereas, 
heroin remains the most dangerous drug in terms of negative health impact, cocaine 
emerged as the number one problematic drug when it comes to drug-related violence 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011, pg. 85). 
 
2.2. Institutional background 
 
The international drug control system is built on three prominent conventions. Firstly, 
the 1961 Single convention authorizes the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB) to exert control over the drug production. The Convention says that INCB 
"...shall endeavour to limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs 
to an adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes..." and: "to 
prevent illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and 
use of, drugs" (United Nations, 1961, pg. 5). The convention requires all parties to 
adopt measures that shall make any action; including cultivation, production, 
manufacture, etc., that is contradictory to the provisions of the convention, a 
punishable offence. The Single Convention puts a focus on supply control. Article 26 
of the convention already states that parties: "shall destroy the coca bushes if illegally 
cultivated", (United Nations, 1961, pg. 14). 
 
                                       
2 Estimated total income derived from cocaine industry in 2009 is 85 billion USD 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). 
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Secondly, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances expands the international 
system of drug control over manufactured drugs, such as amphetamine-type 
stimulants, and gives more room to demand control strategies. Concerning plant-
based drugs, such as cocaine and heroine, this convention does not bring much change 
(United Nations, 1971). 
 
Thirdly, the 1988 Convention "recognized the links between illicit traffic and other 
related organized criminal activity... ".  And that "illicit traffic generates large 
financial profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal organizations to 
penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, legitimate 
commercial and financial business, and society at all its levels" (United Nations, 
1981). Hence the 1988 Convention clearly recognized the high levels of income 
violent groups derive from illicit drug production  
 
The Institution understands illicit traffic in a very broad sense, including the 
"production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering...", as well as "cultivation, 
possession or purchase for the purpose of all previous..."3 (United Nations, 1981). 
 
To respond to the drug problem, article 14 of the Convention requires that: "each 
party shall take appropriate measures to prevent illicit cultivation of and to eradicate 
plants containing narcotic or psychotropic substances, such as opium poppy, coca 
bush and cannabis plants cultivated illicitly in its territory..." (United Nations, 1981). 
Therefore the most recent of the three significant conventions clearly requires 
Colombia, and other supplying states to eradicate coca fields and reduce the drug 
supply. 
 
2.3. The story of cocaine 
 
The coca-leaf has been cultivated and consumed by the indigenous Inca population at 
least since 3000 B.C. After the Spanish conquistadores arrived in South America, 
                                       
3 Article 3 of the 1988 Convention enumerates a number of actions that shall be 
listed as criminal offences. For example production, sale, purchase, possessing, 
offering, but also cultivation for the purpose of production, handling of equipment 
as well as financing, and managing such action, transfer of property derived from 
such offences or inciting others to commit any of these actions. 
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coca-leaf cultivation was almost brought to an end due to the pressure from the 
Catholic Church, who associated coca use with the devil. However, coca consumption 
can enhance workers performance, reduce caloric requirements, prevent labour 
actions as well as forestall altitude sickness. The Spanish conquistadores realized they 
could make use of these "benefits" of coca consumption and because negative health-
related and other risks were not taken into account they started to promote coca 
consumption among the indigenous population in the Andes (United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime, 2008;b). 
 
Perishability of coca-leaves didn't allow for large exports until a cocaine alkaloid, 
enabling for cocaine manufacture was discovered. The popularity of cocaine was 
rising rapidly at the end of 19 century for many reasons. Positive effects on workers 
productivity, popularization by recognized personalities, such as Sigmund Freud, and 
growing use in medicine, dramatically increased cocaine demand. Coca cultivation 
was introduced in other areas outside South America, e.g. Java, Sri Lanka and 
Taiwan.  
 
However, the negative consequences of cocaine consumption soon became obvious 
and cocaine, formerly used as a cure for opium, morphine and alcohol addictions, 
joined the same group of harmful drugs (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2008;b). Nevertheless, the illicit cocaine market continued growing at high pace. 
Colombia had remained, for most of the time, rather a secondary supplier. However, 
due to the crackdowns in Peru and Bolivia, the coca industry moved to Colombia. In 
1997, Colombia became the biggest supplier of cocaine and the coca cultivation grew 
rapidly. By 2000, Colombia grew 74 % of the world's total coca leaves. Over the past 
decade, Colombia survived a period of an intense coca reduction effort and as some 
recent reports suggested, Colombia may again be the smallest of the big three cocaine 
suppliers (Economist, 2013).  
 
While a balanced approach between supply and demand reduction efforts is agreed to 
be most efficient, the current stabilization of the cocaine market is believed to be 
mostly supply-driven (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012, pg. 90). 
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The Colombian government succeeded in dismantling the two main Colombian drug 
cartels - Medellin and Cali, who had a monopoly over the global cocaine supply in the 
mid 90s. The supply went under the control of a large number of small cartelitos, 
usually selling the production either to Mexican groups, or directly to European 
customers (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012, pg. 84). An analysis of 
the cocaine source to the USA, conducted by United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (2007, pg.176 - 182), reveals that the transportation remains organized, 
centralized and in the hands of Mexican syndicates. Moving closer to the raw 
material, the decentralization increases and the cocaine supply becomes under the full 
control of Colombian groups. Coca production is now under the control of a number 
of specialized laboratories directly linked to organized crime.  
 
Unlike production of the drug, coca cultivation is a highly decentralized family-like 
activity, involving up to 68 000 households in Colombia. Different prices are paid for 
the coca base in different regions, indicating that paramilitary groups and cartels use 
mechanisms to encourage and control coca cultivation in Colombia. Hence farmers 
are not making decisions based merely on market situation (United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, 2007, pg.176 - 182). 
 
The supply and demand interactions on the cocaine market 
The illicit drug market operates under the rules of supply and demand. This 
interaction is however influenced by addiction and interdiction. Earlier understanding 
of the cocaine market interaction was that the demand for cocaine is price inelastic. 
The finding that drug users seemed not to react to changes in drug prices was 
interpreted as evidence of price inelasticity, i.e. consumers will demand the drug 
regardless of the price because they are addicted to it and thus in need of the 
substance.  
 
However, recent findings support arguments that demand for illicit drugs is actually 
price elastic, i.e. the demand declines with higher prices. The demand elasticity for 
the particular drug varies for the recreational users and dependent users, however the 
demand eventually declines for both groups (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2012, pg. 68). It does not necessarily mean that the new findings are denying 
earlier conviction about drug price inelasticity. The drug market could have changed 
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and the demand could begin to react to price changes. Higher numbers of recreational 
drug users, or better availability of alternative drugs could explain why the demand is 
now price elastic. 
 
Regarding the supply side aspects, subjects decide how much they will produce and 
supply based on their costs. Unlike the licit production, the costs of raw material and 
manufacturing play rather a small role in the case of cocaine. More important is 
transportation, or distribution costs, and especially the risk-related costs. As the 
cocaine market is illegal (except for a small fraction for medical and scientific 
purposes), suppliers face the risk of being caught and punished. Such risk adds up to 
the financial costs. 
 
 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012, pg. 68) describes that the 
presence of a drug control system increases the risk of illegal production. This risk 
adds to the costs and therefore it will discourage some of the producers from cocaine 
supply chain. Illustrating this on a graph, the supply curve will move to the left with 
increasing supply reduction efforts. Similarly, demand control causes the leftward 
shift of the demand curve. If both curves move to the left, it is clear the there must be 
a new equilibrium on the market. The new equilibrium will be at lower consumption 
levels and higher prices. See Figure 1 for illustration. 
 
Figure 1: Impact of drug control on drug production and consumption. 
 
 
Source: UNODC. 
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2.4. Supply reduction 
 
Supply reduction aspires to cut off the raw material that can be used for the 
production of an illicit substance. This approach is hard to employ with most 
synthetic drugs whose production is dispersed in many laboratories all around the 
world. But cocaine is a plant-based drug, extracted from leaves of a unique plant, 
which is currently cultivated exclusively in a small area in the Andes - within 
Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. The USA continues to be the main promoter of the 
supply reduction approach to the cocaine problem. Crop eradication and provision of 
alternative development is the central tool for reducing the production of illicit drugs 
and one of the main counterdrug strategies for the US (Congressional Research 
Service, 2012, pg. 24). 
 
Three methods are used to reduce coca supply; (i) eradication, (ii) alternative 
development and (iii) law enforcement. Firstly, the eradication of the illegal coca 
plantation can be done either by manual eradication or aerial spraying. The idea is to 
destroy the coca bush so less cocaine can be produced. Secondly, alternative 
development encourages the farmers to voluntarily abandon cultivation by offering 
them an alternative option - cultivation of a licit crop. The third method of supply 
reduction is interdiction, or law enforcement, usually targeting the production 
facilities such as cocaine labs, etc.  
 
At the session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1998 participants made a 
commitment to eliminate or significantly reduce the illicit cultivation of coca bush 
and other plants by 2008 (United Nations, 1998). However, United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (2009, pg. 64) reported only a slight decline from 190 800 ha in 
1998 to 167 600 ha in 2008. A session gathered after 10 years expressed a concern 
about the continuing threat associated with drugs and rescheduled the previous target 
date for the commitment to significantly reduce or eliminate cultivation by 2019 
(United Nations, 2009). 
 
The session articulated 5 shortcomings of present-day illicit drug supply reduction 
efforts: (i) lack of cooperation, coordination and law enforcement, (ii) poor reaction to 
new trafficking trends, (iii) poor reaction to increased violence associated with illicit 
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drugs, (iv) lack of balanced approach, and (v) lack of anti-corruption measures, 
technical assistance and capacity-building (United Nations, 2009).  
 
Regarding the lack of cooperation, the session called for strengthening of research, 
data-collection and assessment tools. There is still a knowledge gap and therefore the 
on-going research should "monitor and assess the qualitative and quantitative impact 
of alternative development and drug crop eradication programs" (United Nations, 
2009).. Findings of this study could help to indicate some areas where the "knowledge 
gap" needs to be filled,  
 
Sequence of supply reduction components 
An Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops 
and on Alternative Development adopted as a resolution A/RES/2-20/4 by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations recognizes that: "effective crop control 
strategies can encompass a variety of approaches, including alternative development, 
law enforcement and eradication" (United Nations, 1998, pg. 1). Alternative 
development is defined as: "a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of 
plants containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through specifically 
designed rural development measures..."(United Nations, 1998, pg. 1). The action 
plan recognizes that in low-income structures, alternative development is more 
sustainable and appropriate than eradication. 
 
The Action Plan, as adopted by the General Assembly, explicitly suggests a roadmap 
to successful supply reduction of coca. The first step is to implement alternative 
development programs. However, the existence of alternative development programs 
is not the only motivation for farmers to abandon the production voluntarily. 
Therefore, law enforcement instruments must become effective to pose a risk on the 
farmers intending to cultivate illicit crops. Eradication comes as a last resort solution. 
 
Unlike the Action plan some actors, such as the US, or Colombian government, seems 
to view the process in a reversed order. Whilst the Action plan suggests that people 
will move toward licit crops, when the opportunities are available and risks visible, 
Plan Colombia provides these programs to support the transition of Colombian 
regions. Because eradication will make cultivation of narcotics less profitable, 
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alternative development programs will help the region with the transition to licit 
economic activity. 
 
2.5. Supply reduction programmes in Colombia 
 
The Colombian case shows characteristics of the "war on drug" strategy with a 
dominating "zero tolerance approach". Many anti-drug programs in Latin America 
have been developed in cooperation with the USA and in most cases put emphasis on 
supply reduction, such as crop eradication and interdiction. For Colombia a major 
strategy called Plan Colombia was created between 1998 and 1999. Among others, 
Plan Colombia aimed at reducing cultivation, as well as processing and distribution of 
illicit drugs. It encompassed variety of assistance for programs targeting eradication, 
alternative development, interdiction, and capacity building as well as support for 
civilian and military institutions.  
 
Plan Colombia 
Plan Colombia is a specific strategy of the Colombian government strongly supported 
by the USA to meet the challenges the country faced at the turn of the millennium. 
Amongst others, Plan Colombia focused on combating the narcotics industry. 
Proposed costs of the program totalled $ 7.5billion for the first two years. The 
Colombian government raised over half of the amount and the US promised a 
package of $ 1.6 billion; of which $ 600 million should have been used to help train 
and equip counter-narcotics battalions, $ 145 million on alternative development 
programs, $ 340 million for interdiction and $ 96 million to enhance Colombian 
National Police eradication abilities (State Department, 2000). 
 
In 2008, the United States Government Accountability Office concluded that drug 
reduction goals (as agreed in Plan Colombia) were not met, but security had 
improved. Nevertheless, coca cultivation did rise by 15 %, and production increased 
by 4% (Government Accountability Office, 2008). However, later data from Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) (the same source as used for the report) 
shows that since 2006 the production was continuously falling and by 2011 it was 
down by more than 60%. 
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The US embassy in Bogota summarizes Plan Colombia as a success. The reason for 
such a conclusion is the fact that the country experienced a rapid decrease in 
homicides, kidnappings, as well as terrorist attacks and attacks on infrastructure 
between 2002 and 2008. In 2007, the Colombian government introduced a new 
strategy based on Plan Colombia, by increasingly focusing on social services 
provision, strengthening democracy and economic development (US embassy and 
Plan Colombia, n.d.). 
 
President Uribe's administration strengthened Plan Colombia in 2003 with a 
"democratic security" strategy. Uribe's idea was that under this strategy, security 
forces would enter areas in order to stabilize them and ensure that civilian agencies 
can provide education, justice, health and other social services.  
 
Recently, the USA has been gradually shifting the responsibilities for counterdrug 
programs, as well as security to Colombian authorities, but the orientation on supply 
reduction approach seems to remain unchanged (Congressional Research 
Service, 2011). 
 
Reducing the coca supply in Colombia 
Developments in coca supply reduction efforts since the creation of Plan Colombia 
can be described in three phases. Initially, the dominant strategy was aerial spraying, 
followed by the focus on manual eradication and finally alternative development 
programs were emphasized.  
 
The sequence of these is logical. In the turn of the millennium, many areas under coca 
cultivation were out of governmental control, thus accessing them would be 
dangerous or even impossible. Low-flying planes can spray large areas at relatively 
low costs, labour intensity and risk. While aerial spraying became the centre of 
criticism for its impact on environment, public health, or socioeconomic situations, 
the use of this method has been declining since its peak in 2006. However, manual 
eradication continued to increase.  
 
Spraying allowed access to previously inaccessible areas for newly trained battalions. 
More effective manual eradication could replace questionable aerial spraying. 
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However such methods require many workers, who would soon become targeted by 
drug traffickers. For example, violent groups installed a number of landmines to 
protect coca fields. Moreover, destroying the coca plant does not necessarily mean 
that the farmer will cease coca cultivation. The need for income and pressure from 
drug traffickers to renew coca fields often gives no other option but to return to illicit 
crop cultivation. Figure 2 illustrates coca-related data for the period of 2001 - 2011. 
 
Figure 2: Coca cultivation, production and eradication in Colombia. 
 
Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy 
 
The last phase is alternative development. These programs are long-standing in terms 
of impact as well as implementation. Providing farmers with incentives to grow licit 
crops would probably not be possible without previous steps during which the 
government gained a presence in the territories and thus could ensure the farmer's 
security, as well as decent income. However, even alternative development has it's 
flaws and criticism. For instance, low availability of the programs, non-sufficient 
infrastructure for farmers to transport their licit production, or low effectiveness etc.  
 
3. Theories, Research and Response 
 
The third chapter of this paper will present theories and academic research, as well as 
the policy maker's response to academic and theoretical claims. This chapter is 
divided into three subsections. Firstly, the theory on drug violence link, as well as two 
theoretical models explaining the interactions between violence and supply reduction 
policies. The second subchapter will present academic research, including the impact 
of supply reduction efforts that has been conducted so far. The third section of this 
chapter will conclude the previous two. 
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3.1. Theories 
 
The Link Between Drugs and Violence 
Although it is not clear whether the presence of drugs creates violence or if a violent 
environment attracts the drug market, there is no doubt about the existence of the link 
between the two. Such establishment is already engraved in the 1988 Convention 
(United Nations, 1988). The link is observable in all producing, transit and consuming 
countries and drug trafficking often accounts for a large part of revenues for 
organized crime groups who use it to support their activities, including violence.  
 
Ikelberg (2003) considers the drug - violence link as a self-fulfilling vicious circle. 
While illicit crops will most likely be cultivated where the government is weak and 
national forces have little control over the territory, the presence of drugs will finance 
and aggravate the conflict. Although a weak state is an important factor, Ikelberg also 
considers other factors that attract the drug economy; for instance poverty, social and 
economic problems, or lack of opportunities. Ikelberg (2003) supposes that the 
presence of a drug economy has 5 consequences, one of them being the increase in 
violence. Drug traffickers fund conflict in the region, use their resources to eliminate 
institutions, or individuals who stand in their way and engage in armed conflict as 
well as rivalry wars. Clashes also occur when farmers fail to repay credit and other 
dispute settling cases. The drug economy also deteriorates the business climate and 
promotes illegal activity. 
 
A study carried out by Perez, Vergara and Percipiano (2002, as cited by Ibanez, 2007) 
calculated that costs of illicit drug production are equivalent to about 1 % of 
Colombian GDP. Ibanez also adds that income from drugs could lead to a larger 
proportion of people carrying weapons, more robberies and higher alcohol 
consumption. 
 
Singer (2008) pledges to include drugs among factors posing a threat to development. 
He provides a summary of five impacts of drugs on development. Violence and 
corruption, as well as an impact on productivity, threat to youth and health problems 
make up this group. Singer (2008) summarizes that much of the drug-related violence 
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is most likely to be the result of the fight for the drug market among various groups, a 
response to increased pressure from the government, or reaction on major disruption 
on particular drug market.  
 
Income from illicit drug trade gives traffickers resources to: "evade government 
detection; undermine and co-opt legitimate social, political, and economic systems 
through corruption, extortion, or more violent forms of influence; penetrate legitimate 
economic structures through money laundering; and in some instances, challenge the 
authority of national government", Congressional Research Service (2012, pg. 6). 
 
Similarly, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010) views drug 
trafficking to be risky in two ways. First, the illegal armed groups may tax or manage 
illicit drug production, and second, these groups may have enough power to undertake 
violent actions. 
 
According to the Congressional Research Service (2011, pg 6), research has shown 
that drug related violence became the primary source for insecurity, especially in drug 
transit and production countries. Drug trafficking groups use violence to protect their 
routes, or in some cases to undermine police and criminal justice institutions. 
Nevertheless, whilst Latin America remains a region with the highest crime rates in 
the world (on average as little as 5 % of murders committed in Latin America will 
result in criminal conviction), Colombia conversely made a progress in reducing 
crime and violence lately. 
 
The justification for eradication efforts in Colombia seems to be clear in theory. It is 
the finding that paramilitary and insurgency groups, such as FARC, AUC, or ELN, 
derive large profits from illicit trade with cocaine. Cutting these groups from such 
income should reduce their capacity to undermine civil institutions and to involve in 
violent activities. For instance, in the early years of Plan Colombia, Carlos Castaňo, a 
commander of AUC, revealed in an interview that landowners were no longer able to 
pay their "security payment"4 to the AUC and drug money accounted for up to 70 % 
of organisation's revenues (Economist ,2000). 
                                       
4 initially the main source of income for AUC 
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The value of the global cocaine market has shrunk and cocaine prices fell. Violent 
groups in Colombia had to face a decrease in their drug-related incomes. The overall 
income derived from cocaine retail sales fell from an estimated $ 165 billion in mid 
1990s to about a half, $ 85 billon in 2009 (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2011, pg. 124-125). Above that, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(2012, pg. 85) presents Colombia as the case where supply reduction efforts did result 
in loss of income for paramilitary groups, specifically FARC. For this reason there 
may be a decrease in violence in Colombia. 
 
Many analysts agree that Plan Colombia helped to reduce violence in the country, but 
also had other consequences, for instance, displacement, environmental damage, and 
coca cultivation dispersion (Congressional Research Service, 2011). Nevertheless, 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012, pg. 95) suggests continuation of 
recent eradication efforts of coca leaf production has a chance to be eliminated as 
previously was the case of Thailand. Though declining, yet still above the average 
levels of violence in Colombia, adds additional incentive to combat the drug industry. 
 
Andersson et al. (2006) conversely contradicts the drug - violence link. They suggest 
that violent groups may not generate as large of a profit from drugs as it has been 
thought. In their brief calculation, using UNODC's estimates on wholesale cocaine 
price, they assume, that each violent group in Colombia can generate only about 
USD 100 million a year from the coca business.  
 
Mathematical models incorporating supply reduction policies and violence 
Burrus (1999) and Caulkins & Reuter (2006) created two mathematical models 
explaining the effects of supply reduction on violence. While Burrus (1999) argues 
that supply reduction efforts will reduce the violence, Caulkins & Reuter (2006) 
advocate for the opposite. 
 
Burrus (1999) built a theoretical model that could explain the relationship between 
supply reduction and violence. His model sees drug suppliers as geographic 
monopolists who make decisions to commit violence depending on profits they expect 
to gain from the territory under their control. Drug suppliers commit violence in order 
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to secure their territory, however, they also have to take into account the costs of 
committing a violent act. If the violence is at its optimal level, the marginal benefit of 
committing a violent act is equal to the expected costs of such  a violent act.  
 
Therefore, Burrus theorized, that if supply reduction had increased, suppliers would 
have lowered the quantity of drugs they supply, while increasing the price. Despite 
the higher prices, the overall expected profit for the particular supplier derived from 
his territory will decrease. With decreased profits, the marginal benefit of committing  
a violent act is also decreasing hence, the supplier will decide to commit less violent 
actions than before the increase in supply reduction efforts. According to Burrus, the 
theoretical model is roughly consistent with data from the period of 1989 - 1997. 
 
On the other hand, Caulkins & Reuter (2006) contested the standard model. Their 
model attempts to explain the empirical findings that cocaine price has not increased, 
as assumed by the standard model, but rather decreased. They consider several supply 
reduction policies, but only one - removing an individual from the drug market may 
have a positive effect on overall levels of violence. The removed individual will be 
replaced, however, the benefits occur in a case when abnormally violent individual 
has been removed and replaced by a less violent one.  
 
Other interventions of supply side policies considered in the model such as increasing 
enforcement at known sites, increasing penalties for dealing drugs, or arresting drug 
users may have a significant adverse effect on violence.  
 
Nevertheless, the model of Caulkins & Reuter (2006) only considers supply reduction 
policies on the market of consumption (i.e. supply reduction in cocaine) and unlike 
Burrus (1999) does not mention eradication or other supply reduction policies in the 
country of drug's origin (i.e. supply reduction in coca). Moreover, though these 
theoretical models could possibly be applied in the case of Colombia, they focus 
rather on the violence levels on the market of consumption and do not consider the 
specifics of the cocaine market (e.g. concentration of production, and other factors). 
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Operationalization of violence 
Poveda (2012) investigates the determinants of violence in 7 cities of Colombia. He 
conceptualizes the violence as a cost benefit analysis. In line with Becker's paradigm, 
formed in late 60s, he assumes that individuals allocate their time between legal and 
illegal activity while considering return of such activity to be the benefit and risk and 
rigorousness of punishment to be the cost of violence. 
 
To measure violence, Poveda (2012) uses homicide rates. Moreover, he concludes 
that there is a relationship between drug seizures and homicide rates and interprets his 
finding that higher level of drug seizures will result in lower motivation to commit  a 
violent act. His findings could be theoretically applied to supply reduction in general. 
With increasing supply reduction, motivation to commit violence should decrease. 
 
Preliminary conclusion 
To conclude, a comprehensive bulletproof theory that would effectively describe the 
relationship between the two variables - coca supply reduction and violence in 
Colombia, has not been developed. This chapter will now present academic research 
and will conclude with a set of theoretical as well as empirical claims that will serve 
as a theoretical framework for this study. 
 
3.2. Earlier research 
 
General research on supply reduction 
A majority of research on supply reduction programs aimed at cocaine or drug related 
issues focuses on the effects of particular programs on drug availability, use, price or 
similar characteristics observable in the country of consumption. Only a few studies 
look on the manifestations of supply reduction programs in the source country. Papers 
examining effects of supply reduction efforts in the country of production focus 
mainly on the link to environment, health, and socio-economic characteristics.  
 
Aerial spraying has been criticised by many studies, especially for its negative impact 
on environment, health, water contamination, or impact on licit cultivation. For 
example Peterson (2002), Ferrer (2005), or Shields (2005). Spraying has also been 
criticised for its ineffectiveness as farmers always found ways to avoid damages 
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caused by spraying. Farmers increasingly moved their production deeper into the 
jungle, started to cultivate coca on smaller fields in order to be less attractive to 
fumigating planes, or mix licit with illicit crops. If spraying was followed by rainfall 
applied substance was washed away and the harvest was saved. Likewise, farmers 
realised that washing the crops after spraying would save their harvest. Refer, for 
example, to Wilson (2001).  
 
Eradication, including aerial spraying and manual eradication has also been criticized 
for negative socio-economical impacts. Coca cultivation is often the only profitable 
activity for farmers in remote, rural areas of Colombia. Farmers simply have no other 
option than to reinstate coca fields, as there is no licit alternative that would generate 
sufficient income. Programs of alternative developments became increasingly 
highlighted. 
 
On the contrary, US government refuses the criticism, arguing that only 15 % of 
glyphosate, criticized for causing environmental and health damages, is used for 
eradication. Colombian farmers use the remaining 85 % for agricultural purposes in 
the licit production. Moreover, the US government argues, that chemicals used to 
produce cocaine are those that should be blamed for contaminating water sources. 
Concerning claims that aerial eradication often miss the target and destroy licit 
production, Washington admits that out of 7 800 claims, about 100 of them was 
verified and affected farmers were reimbursed. No claim of harm to health have been 
ever verified (Embassy of the United States, n.d., or Congressional Research 
Service, 2005). 
 
Results of supply reduction programs in Colombia 
Supply reduction efforts keep to be presented as a tool to cut violent groups from their 
illicit drug income. Long time supporter of eradication is the US. The White House 
(2005, pg. 41-43) appraises the recent decline in cocaine production and claims, that 
eradication is the factor that significantly reduced the amount of money flowing to 
narcoterrorist groups. Recent National Drug Control Strategy remains stubborn 
regarding eradication, however more emphasis seems to be put on alternative 
development programs. The White House (2012, pg. 35) states that alternative 
development in combination with government presence and eradication efforts 
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continues to be the prominent tools to reduce cultivation. The case of Peru is used as 
an example to demonstrate the success of this approach. 
 
Buckley (2004) also views the Plan Colombia as a success because it achieved 
bringing down terrorist attacks by 53 %, kidnappings by 34 % and homicides by 
45 %. Buckley agrees with the US approach to use eradication first. According to 
him, the first step is to cut the violent groups from the drug money in order to 
decrease violence. As a conclusion, Buckley gives several recommendations. He 
points out that while supply side measures are necessary, they are not sufficient and 
must be complemented with demand reduction. Also he recommends continuation of 
the policy as the insurgent groups may still posses some resources that allow them to 
continue fighting. 
 
Elhawary (2010) also agrees that the security in Colombia has improved thanks to the 
Plan Colombia and more recent "democratic security" policy. However, he is 
questioning the universality of the security gained and argues that while many urban 
and economic centres has been stabilized, the situation on rural areas remained 
unchanged.  
 
Similarly, some studies criticize that the relationship between coca cultivation and 
violence does not hold up when looking at regional rather than national data. One 
such study has been published by Holmes et al. (2006) who analysed the link between 
crime and violence in four departments5 with high coca cultivation and high violence 
levels. They conclude that there is a significant and positive link between coca 
eradication and leftist guerrilla violence. Holmes et al. found a negative relationship 
between export and violence hence they suggest that: "meaningful opportunities for 
the inclusive economic development should be promoted...". The time period, for their 
analysis, spans from 1991 to 2001. 
 
Reyes (2012) looks at even smaller administration units. He quantifies the 
relationship between eradication and coca cultivation in 257 municipalities (out of 
1119). His findings indicated that a one per cent increase in eradication efforts results 
                                       
5 out of total 32, respectively 33 including the capital 
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in approximately a 1 % increase in cultivation. The analysis takes into  account years 
2001 - 2006. Reyes (2012) points out that alternative methods of coca reduction have 
been underfunded and suggests that: "A carefully planned relocation of government 
spending from eradication to alternative development may be a first step toward 
finding effective ways to reduce coca production in Colombia." However, the analysis 
on a municipal level uses data on eradicated area, thus not including other supply 
reduction methods. 
 
The opposite result was found by a study on La Macarena municipality, an 
assessment of the Plan de Consolidación integral de la Macarena, published by 
DeShazo et al. (2009). Currently, there is a strong military presence in the region. 5 
out of 6 municipal urban centres are now secure and with declining coca cultivation. 
Authorities are confident that FARC's income from drugs has been disrupted in this 
region. However the situation few years ago was completely different. Historically, 
La Macarena region has been the centre for FARC's operations as well as major coca 
cultivating region. The process that resulted in current stabilization of the region 
started with aerial spraying. Due to the criticism of aerial spraying, since 2006 only 
manual eradication has been used. As a conclusion, authors recommended, amongst 
other measures, to closely focus on alternative development and support eradication 
with short-term food aid and cash subsidies. Although much remains to be done, the 
case of La Macarena region can serve as an example for a successful transformation 
of other regions in Colombia (DeShazo, 2009). 
 
USAID (2009) further highlights that state presence is crucial for counter narcotics 
efforts. The security provided by the presence of the state undermines the narcotics 
activities of armed groups. Moreover, security serves as a necessary precondition for 
successful anti narcotics policies, especially alternative development. For instance, in 
times of insecurity, attacks prevent  land traveling therefore, farmers could not deliver 
their licit harvest. 
 
Similarly, Andersson et al. (2006) argues that aerial spraying takes place because the 
state is not present in many parts of the country. In such a case, it is the only method 
available. If state presence is restored the government can take on more effective 
methods, such as manual eradication, or interdiction of cocaine labs. Similarly, the 
  
 
 23 
US government, though not contesting the benefits of alternative development 
programs, argues that aerial spraying should be preceded by eradication. 
 
Outside Colombia there are not many examples of successful supply reduction 
policies. Roberts et al. (2004) claim that concerning plant-based drugs, one such 
example is reduction in Myanmar and Laos. However, positive results were 
associated with large costs. The authors argue that according to the basic rules of 
economics, results of policies oriented in supply will only be a short term solution 
unless accompanied with effective demand side policies.  
 
Shift in understanding of drug related violence 
An earlier understanding that violence is an effect of drug use has been increasingly 
contested. None of the authors argue about the positive correlation between drug use 
and violence, but most explain it through social marginalization. Though a significant  
number of crime is committed in order to obtain money for drugs, these are often 
petty crimes. Such crime is mostly "systemic" and these individuals would most likely 
commit crimes irregardless of using drugs (for example Stevens, et al., 2005; or 
United Nations, 2003). More serious violence is associated with groups that aspire to 
gain or maintain a share of the illicit drug market. For example Brownstein (2000) 
conceptualized drug-related violence as a form of dispute settling. While disputes in 
legal economic activity can be settled at court, disputes in the illicit drug market are 
resolved through violence. 
 
Unfortunately, only a few studies investigate the effect of supply reduction on 
violence. Werb, et al. (2011) conducted a English language literature review to 
examine the impact of law enforcement on drug violence. By searching databases for 
relevant terms, including "violence", "drug-related violence" etc., the authors 
indicated 314 potentially eligible studies. Of these, 299 were excluded due to not 
presenting new data or deemed as non-relevant. The analysis revealed that out of 15 
eligible studies, 93 % reported an opposite effect of law enforcement on violence, i.e. 
increase in violence with an increase in law enforcement efforts. One study reported 
no significant relationship. 
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Although, the review by Werb, et al. (2011) is extensive, it used studies dealing 
mostly with analysis conducted in the 90s. Moreover, most studies examined the law 
enforcement - violence link in the country of consumption, predominantly in the US 
and Australia.  
 
Another study by Cornell (2005) examines the effect of drug presence on conflict. 
Following the literature on natural resource curse, the author argues for the inclusion 
of drugs into the same category. His study found that although the presence of drugs 
does not appear to be linked with the emergence of a conflict, drug production is 
boosted during the armed conflict. Such increase of drug production allows insurgents 
to support their activities and finance the war. Hence the presence of drugs is likely to 
prolong the duration of the conflict.  
 
Data Concerns 
A small number of researchers challenged the official estimates of coca production. 
For example, Leoncini et al. (2012) advocate for a different methodology to calculate 
coca production. Investigating developments of coca price, supply and demand, 
authors claim that numbers in official statistics on coca cultivation are likely to be 
lower than reality. There are three reasons they claim to be the causes for such 
underestimation. First, the official measurements of coca cultivation do not cover the 
entire area where coca may be cultivated. Second, corrections and assumptions pose  
a high level of uncertainty and third, mixed fields (legal and illegal crops on one field) 
may not be detected by current measurements. The threat their finding has on this 
study will be discussed later.   
 
3.3. Theoretical summary 
 
Current understanding of the drug related violence has shifted away from being 
considered as the consequence of drug abuse. It is now agreed that most of the 
violence is associated with the fight over the drug market. Drug-related violence can 
be understood as a form of "dispute settling", or effort to gain or preserve presence on 
the market. Drugs remain to be a significant income for the violent groups in 
Colombia.  
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Many politicians agree that to break the drug - violence link, the coca supply must be 
curbed. Supply reduction will however be only short termed, and supply would 
bounce back immediately after the withdrawal of the reductionist policies to satisfy 
the demand, unless it is accompanied with a decrease in demand. Globally, cocaine 
demand remains constant, however the demand in the USA has significantly 
decreased. Numerous reports suggested that Colombia produces nearly all of the US 
supply, while Peru and Bolivia are suppliers for other markets. With a decrease in the 
US demand and higher use of alternative development programs, cocaine supply 
reduction in Colombia can now be, as many policymakers believe, successful and 
sustainable. 
 
However, reduction in the cocaine market supply could have effects on violence 
levels in cocaine production regions. There are two camps, each arguing for the 
opposite effect. One camp supports the claim that supply reduction does decrease 
violence. Supply reduction, including alternative development as well as eradication 
promotes licit economic activity, as well as it increases the relative costs (especially 
the risk) for coca suppliers. Therefore with less drugs, violent groups controlling the 
production in Colombia should have less capacity or incentives to act violently, hence 
the violence levels should decline. To promote the development of Colombian 
regions, government needs to gain the presence over the region and ensure the 
provision of public goods, especially security, education and infrastructure, as well as 
various alternative development programs that provide farmers with an alternative 
choice to coca cultivation. 
 
Others, however, disagree and believe that there is an adverse link between supply 
reduction and violence, i.e. with more supply reduction, there will be more violence. 
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4. Methodology 
 
Based on previously described theory and empirical research, the fourth chapter will 
present the concept which will be used in this study. This chapter will also discuss 
several assumptions and the data used in the analysis. To remind, the research 
question is asking: "Can the reduction in coca cultivation be interpreted as successful 
in terms of stabilizing the security situation in Colombia?" 
 
4.1. Concept and assumptions 
 
This study aims to research the link between illicit drugs and violence. The link is 
well established and has not been significantly contested. More specifically, this study 
aims to investigate the effects of drug reduction on the local levels of violence, which 
is a less known area of study. 
 
The independent variable in this study is area under coca cultivation. It is influenced 
by eradication, interdiction, as well as alternative developments. As described earlier, 
these efforts may have an impact on violence levels, which is the dependent variable 
in this study. 
 
As it is known that armed groups derive significant profits from drug trafficking and 
use them to commit violence in order to secure their activities and as such, lowering 
coca supply will decrease their profits. This can have an effect on violence because 
armed groups will either loose their capacity to get involved in violent activities or 
conversely, increase the pressure to win the lucrative market back. 
 
Hypothesis 
In compliance with the previous sections, there may be an observable manifestation of 
the drug - violence relationship. Lets suppose that the argument of policy makers is 
correct and the coca reduction will cut violent groups from their income causing  
them to loose the capacity to get involved in violent acts. The following hypothesizes 
assumes this argumentation. 
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Considering the marked decline in Colombian coca cultivation, which fell from 
163,000 hectares in 2000 to 64,000 hectares in 2011 (United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, 2012;b), the hypothesis expects a decline in violence levels: 
 
H1: Reduction in coca supply will translate into decline of homicide rates. 
H2: Reduction in coca supply will translate into decline of kidnapping rates. 
 
Assumptions 
Naturally, this study builds on several assumptions that may pose some limitation to 
the findings.  
 
Assumption I: Equal levels of productivity 
In recent years, Colombian cocaine labs have developed more efficient ways for 
extracting cocaine from coca leaves. If the productivity would vary across Colombia, 
decrease in coca cultivation in one area could be offset by an increase in productivity, 
hence the same amount of cocaine could be produced and generate similar income 
with different amounts of input.  
 
There is no precise data statistics for local level production or productivity. The 
reason is that measuring production is very complicated. For example, a method 
estimating local level productivity from interdiction data may be significantly biased 
as local authorities tend to overestimate the productivity in order to escalate the 
importance of the particular interdiction. No impartial institution is authenticating 
interdiction data. For these reasons, the study uses coca cultivation data and assumes 
that the productivity does not significantly vary across Colombian regions.  
 
Assumption II: Homogeneity of the regions 
The second assumption is linked to the previous one. Likewise, it assumed that 
productivity is the same across Colombia. This study also assumes that other factors 
do not vary significantly. These factors are intervening variables that could influence 
variables under investigation, such as amount of coca leaf harvested from one hectare 
of cultivation, as well as amount of cocaine extracted from one coca leaf, 
transportation costs, revenues from the wholesale cocaine sales, etc. Also, at this 
  
 
 28 
stage, the study does not assume a significant difference in general policy and 
conditions among various regions in concern. 
 
Assumption III: Reliability of data 
As the study relies on second-hand datasets, it is assumed that these are correct. 
Despite the strong efforts to measure cocaine supply production, the fact that the 
cocaine market is clandestine poses a major obstacle to the measurements.  
 
For example Leoncini et al. (2012) argued that data concerning coca production may 
be underestimated. They use a different methodology for production estimation 
suggesting that the cocaine supply is underestimated. Section 4.2. Data and 
Measurement explains why their finding does not pose a significant threat to this 
study. Nevertheless, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2009) is very 
confident about the precision of its coca cultivation estimation.  
 
Assumption IV: Causality 
The problem of "what causes what" is a central point to most of the research. This 
study assumes that the link begins with supply reduction. If reduction efforts are 
increased, it lowers profits for violent groups who consequently have to react to the 
lowering profits. It either gives them less capacity to commit violent crimes, or the 
groups with less income become desperate and increase their involvement in violent 
activities to "win back" the market or strengthen their existing positions. The point of 
this assumption is the direction of the link, not the positive or negative relationship. 
The reason is that the link could run the opposite way. With more violence from the 
armed groups, politicians would have higher incentives to crack down on coca 
cultivation. 
 
Assumption V: GDP/capita as a proxy for dependence on coca cultivation 
As has been described, coca cultivation is often the only economic activity that 
generates a decent income for many Colombians. It would be useful to be able to 
measure the "dependence on coca". Unfortunately, such data does not exist. While  
the unemployment rate could serve as a good proxy, there is a lack of data for many 
of the regions. Therefore GDP per capita can be used as a proxy for dependence.  
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The justification for using GDP per capita is that a higher value indicates that there 
may be more economic activities available for the coca producers. Also higher GDP 
increases the opportunity costs for coca producers. The reason is that labour can be 
allocated either in licit or illicit activity. An individual who decides to involve in illicit 
cocaine production has to sacrifice a potential income from his legal employment. In 
regions with low GDP per capita, this sacrifice is very small. However, if the GDP 
per capita is very high and could generate decent or even higher profits, less people 
would be willing to undergo the risks associated with coca industry. 
 
4.2. Data and measurement 
 
To measure the variables, there is a need for complex data that was taken from 
secondary sources. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the database used in the 
analysis. The Colombian administration divides the country into 32 departments plus 
the capital city of Bogota, which is often mentioned as a 33rd department. 
Departments consist of smaller administrative units called municipalities and these 
are subdivided into even smaller corregimientos. This study uses data on the 
departmental level. Local level data on coca cultivation and homicide rates for the 
years 2004 - 2011 will be used. 
 
Coca cultivation 
Measuring the area under coca cultivation requires extensive resources and 
experience. Most extensive data on coca cultivation are provided by two main 
agencies - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and The White 
House Office of National Drug Control Policy. This study will make use of the data 
provided by UNODC. The reason for using UNODC data is that these seem to be 
more robust. Also, the US government did not cover the entire area under coca 
cultivation prior to 2005 hence previous data may be underestimated. UNODC 
achieved full coverage of their measurement in 2001. 
 
Since 2002, UNODC publishes a Coca Cultivation survey for each country affected 
by cultivation of the illicit crop. For Colombia, the office measures the area under 
cultivation using satellite images collected between September and March of the 
following year. For the 2011 census, 87 images covering the entire territory except 
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that of the San Andres and Providence Islands were analyzed. The census uses 
repeatedly taken images from more satellites to avoid failures to the measurement 
caused by clouds and other disturbing elements. The images are geo-referenced, i.e. 
the image with least cloudiness is assigned to the map and visually analysed. To 
validate the data gained from satellite images, verifying overflights are being used.  
 
After the analysis and validation, UNODC makes a series of corrections to the data 
obtained from the method described previously. An area reported to the UNODC as 
manually eradicated after the date when images were taken is subtracted from the 
total area under cultivation. Aerial spraying is also subtracted, but this method has a 
2  % crop survival rate. To adjust for new fields that were planted after the images 
were taken, monthly increase/decrease rate is considered. Despite all the efforts to 
avoid clouds and shades, 15 % of the area, mostly in departments of Nariňo, Norte de 
Santander, Choco and Cordoba had to be corrected due to lack of data. In these cases 
there are no usable images collected throughout the year, the cultivated area under 
clouds or gaps is estimated from past year census while taking into consideration the 
trend for the region. An area of coca cultivation, smaller than 0.25 hectares, may not 
be detected therefore, UNODC also estimates and adjusts the data for small fields 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012;b, pg. 89-100). 
 
Although using eradication data would seem to make more sense for the analysis, it 
would actually make it more complicated for two reasons. First, eradication often 
exceeds the total area under coca cultivation because many areas are being eradicated 
several times a year. Similarly, fumigating planes may miss their target hence the area 
fumigated does not necessarily correspond to the area where the coca supply has been 
decreased. Moreover, eradication data does not consider voluntary abandonments of 
coca field under alternative development programs. As the study aims to evaluate the 
impact of supply reduction in general, not specifically eradication, these forms of 
supply reduction need to be taken into account. 
 
There have been attempts to challenge the official statistics on cocaine cultivation, for 
instance, Leoncini et al. (2012). Nevertheless, the authors themselves mention that the 
puzzle may also be explained by increased productivity in cocaine manufacturing, an 
alternative opinion argued for by the UNODC. Moreover, authors contested the 
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overall methodology used for coca cultivation measurements, so if the statistics are 
indeed underestimated, the total area would be higher proportionally in all the 
regions. 
 
Violence 
To measure violence in Colombia, homicide rates and data on kidnappings will be 
used in this study. Each year Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencías 
Forenses (INMLC) collects data on autopsies with murder being the probable manner 
of death. Homicide is understood as a criminal act of murdering a human. In order to 
compare homicide data across region, homicide rates, i.e. number of homicide cases 
per 100 000 inhabitations are being used. Homicide rate is being calculated by the 
INMLC itself. 
 
Colombia experienced sharp decline in homicides rates, which fell to almost a half 
between 2001 and 2011. Most of the years, Colombia reported a statistically 
significant decrease in homicide rates, however especially in its earliest reports, 
INMLC pointed out the different murder distribution among Colombian regions. In 
2001, INMLC enumerated Guaviare, Putumayo, Antiquia, Arauca, Valle and 
Risaralda as departments with highest homicide rates. Of these, Putumayo, Guaviare 
and Antiquia are among regions with the highest coca cultivation. In 2011, homicide 
rate in these regions remained above the average. Only Guaviare reported a rate of 
38,15 which can be consider relatively close to the average of 35, 95, INMLCF 
(2011). 
 
Statistics on kidnaping cases are collected continuously by two institutions - 
Fondelibertad and País Libre, as well as many NGOs and other organisations. 
Fondelibertad is an office of the Ministry of Defence responsible for creating policies 
against kidnappings. País Libre Foundación is a NGO founded in the 90s by 
Francisco Santos, current Colombian president. The data on kidnappings for the years 
2004 - 2011 used in this study is derived from the Ministry of Foreign Defence of 
Colombia. Total number of kidnapping cases is converted into kidnapping rates using 
the population data taken from DANE, The National Administrative Department of 
Statistics. 
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5. Analysis  
 
The fifth chapter is divided into two subchapters. First part of this chapter will present 
the method, which will be used in the analysis and the second part will present and 
discuss the results of the analysis. 
 
5.1. Method 
 
To approach the problem, I will use the SPSS program to analyse the relationship 
between coca cultivation, homicide rates and kidnapping rates. This study uses a 
dataset for coca cultivation including 23 departments for which significant coca 
cultivation is reported6. 
 
The analysis will be made in two stages. First, it will be conducted separately for 
the 6 regions with the highest reduction of coca cultivation area reported, namely, 
Meta, Guaviare, Caquetá, Bolivar and Vichada (in decreasing order). This group will 
be referred to as "top 6". The reason for this step is that the aim of this study is to 
research the impact of supply reduction. In regions with increasing cultivation (for 
instance Cauca, or Putumayo) there would be negative values for reduction and it may 
have a different impact on violence, not necessarily opposite to the case when coca 
cultivation is being reduced. In the second step, the study will analyze the entire 
population of all 23 regions and compare both results. 
 
The independent variable used in the analysis is "area under coca cultivation", or 
"are". There are also two dependent variables, "homicide rates", or "hom" and 
"kidnapping rates", or "kid". To differ between the "top 6" and the entire population, 
an index with the number of regions of concern will follow the variable. GDP per 
capita (in 1000 pesos) will be added as an predictor in the last part of the analysis.  
 
The dataset used in this paper has a form of panel data (time series cross-sectional) 
i.e. dataset includes observations of N individuals over t periods of times. To be more 
                                       
6 The dataset does not include the following departments: Atlántico, Casanare, 
Cesar, Huila, Quindío, Risaralda, San Andrés y Providencia, Sucre, Tolima and the 
capital city Bogotá. 
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concrete there are 8 observations for each year between 2003 and 2011 across 23 
Colombian departments.  
 
In the analysis a general linear model will be build. The panel data regression model 
is represented by equation (1), where yit is the dependent variable at time t for an 
individual i, αi is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect, x is the independent 
variable, and β is the coefficient for the variable area under coca cultivation, uit is the 
fixed or random effects and errors. More specifically, uit consist of individual specific, 
time invariant effect as well as group effect and errors. In equation (2), coefficient δ 
represents the coefficient for the variable GDP per capita. 
 
 
   yit = αi + βxit + uit    (1) 
   yit = αi + βx1it + δx2it + uit    (2) 
 
Several problems can be encountered with analysing panel data. The main problem is 
correlation of errors. An OLS regression could be biased it assumes that individual 
errors are not correlated. However, the panel dataset design can include spatial, 
contemporaneous or autocorrelation of errors. Spatial correlation of errors can occur 
if errors for one region are correlated across time, e.g. one region always reports 
higher values. Contemporaneous correlation of errors is the case, where errors at a 
single point in time, share a common component, e.g. the data measured in one year, 
is higher for all units. Autocorrelation means, that what happened at particular time 
can influence what will happen later, e.g. an event encountered in one region in one 
year, can influence efforts in the following year(s) in the same region. The last 
problem with panel data analysis is unit heterogeneity, i.e. the units are different from 
each other. Although all the regions are part of the same country, some departments 
can have different characteristics than others and these differences can influence the 
data.  
 
To avoid these problems a linear mixed model option in the SPSS program will be 
used to analyse the data. Six models called A, B, C, D, E and F will be used. Model A 
is a regular regression model. The regression model does take into an account fixed 
effect for the independent variable. Model B will incorporate random intercepts for 
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each region. The last, model C, adds random slopes. Models D, E and F are analogical 
to A, B, C, but analyses the entire population. To compare the models, -2log 
likelihood will be used. Lowest value will indicate the best model. The last part of the 
analysis will add GDP as another predictor. 
 
5.2. Results of the analysis 
 
This section will present results of the analysis. The next chapter will provide a 
discussion of the results and will draw a conclusion based on the findings presented in 
this chapter. As statistically significant, all cases with significance coefficient lower 
than 0.05 are considered.  
 
First, results for the effect on homicide rates are presented in Figure 3. The following 
Figure 4 presents results for the model considering kidnapping rates as a dependent 
variable. 
 
Figure 3: Summary of the results for dependent variable homicide rates.  
	  
N	  =	  6	  (regions)	   N	  =	  23	  (regions)	  
Model	   A	   B	   C	   D	   E	   F	  
-­‐2log	  likelihood	   409,889	   381,596	   380,637	   1538,932	   1368,164	   1358,151	  
Intercept	   26,825*	   53,245*	   51,673*	   37,25*	   39,455*	   37,724*	  
are	   0,0055*	   0,001	   0,0008	   0,0012*	   0,0005	   0,0009	  
std.	  error	   0,0017	   0,0011	   0,0019	   0,0006	   0,0006	   0,0017	  
*	  statistically	  significant	  results	  (p < .005) 
 
 
Figure 4: Summary of the results for dependent variable kidnapping rates.  
 
 N	  =	  6	  (regions)	   N	  =	  23	  (regions)	  
	  	   A	   B	   C	   D	   E	   F	  
-­‐2log	  likelihood	   239,319	   231,503	   227,078	   988,772	   968,168	   957,987	  
Intercept	   -­‐1,391 -­‐1,511 -­‐0,735 2,237* 1,998* 2,181* 
are	   0,0008*	   0,0008*	   0,0007*	   0,0001*	   0,0002	   0,0002	  
std.	  error	   0,0001	   0,0001	   0,0002	   0,000059	   0,000083	   0,0001	  
*	  statistically	  significant	  results	  (p < .005) 
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As can be seen, the value for -2log likelihood indicator is smallest for the C, 
respectively F model. In other words intercepts and random slopes of the each regions 
vary for the relationship between area under coca cultivation and homicide, 
respectively kidnapping rates. Hence the difference between individual regions is a 
factor, which can influence the analysis. 
 
The estimated coefficients can be added to the equation (1). The following equations 
illustrate the outcome of regression analysis considering area under coca cultivation 
as the dependent variable. The following equations present coefficients of the best 
model, i.e. C, or F respectively. Equations (3) represents the relation for homicide 
rates and equation (4) kidnapping rates.  
 
  y6hom = 51,673 +  0,0008x + uit    (3) 
  y23hom = 37,724 +  0,0009x + uit    (3) 
 
  y6kid = -0,735 + 0,0007x + uit     (4) 
  y23kid = 2,181 + 0,0002x + uit     (4) 
 
These equations indicate that the relationship between the area under coca cultivation 
and homicide, or kidnapping rates respectively is very small. A unit change in the 
area under coca cultivation is associated with a change of 0,0008 (taking into account 
top 6 region), respectively 0,0009 (considering all the 23 regions) in the homicide 
rate. The relationship is positive, i.e. an increase in the area under coca cultivation is 
associated with an increase in the homicide rate. The same applies to the second 
dependent variable - kidnapping rates. Here the change is even smaller. Specifically 
in the 6 regions unit increase in the area under coca cultivation is associated with 
0,0007 increase in kidnapping rate. Considering all the 23 regions, the associated 
increase is only 0,0002. 
 
Moreover, not all of these coefficients are statistically significant. Considering the 
model C and F, only coefficient associating a unit change in the area under coca 
cultivation with 0,0007 change in the kidnapping rate was statistically significant. 
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Figures 5 and 6 present results for the analysis including GDP per capita as another 
predictor. As can be noticed, model C (F respectively), i.e. models with random 
intercepts and slopes have the lowest -2 log likelihood values. 
 
Figure 5: Summary of the results for dependent variable homicide rates.  
	   N	  =	  6	  (regions)	   N	  =	  23	  (regions)	  Model	   A	   B	   C	   D	   E	   F	  
-­‐2log	  
likelihood	   409,887	   380,317	   380,219	   239,251	   229,727	   225,993	  
Intercept	   26,444	   69,442*	   62,411*	   -­‐1,208337	   0,330498	   0,0395267	  
are	   0,0056*	   -­‐0,00018	   0,000151	   0,000765*	   0,000675*	   0,000564*	  
std.	  error	   0,001684	   0,00144	   0,001859	   0,000126	   0,000143	   0,000215	  
gdp	   0,000034	   -­‐0,001062	  
-­‐
0,000679	   -­‐0,000018	   -­‐0,000136	   -­‐0,000073	  
std.	  error	   0,000774	   0,000901	   0,000857	   0,000069	   0,000094	   0,000069	  
*	  statistically	  significant	  results	  (p < .005) 
 
 
Figure 6: Summary of the results for dependent variable kidnapping rates.  
 N	  =	  6	  (regions)	   N	  =	  23	  (regions)	  
	  	   A	   B	   C	   D	   E	   F	  
-­‐2log	  
likelihood	   1518,873	   1367,757	   1349,397	   988,771	   955,036	   941,045	  
Intercept	   19,197036*	   36,282438*	   32,765547*	   2,221586*	   4,761433*	   6,364310*	  
are	   0,001707*	   0,000733	   0,000403	   0,000150*	   0,000137	   0,000099	  
std.	  error	   0,000529	   0,000684	   0,001075	   0,00006	   0,000098	   0,000105	  
gdp	   0,002045*	   0,000311	   0,000603	   0,000002	   -­‐0,000322*	  
-­‐
0,000630*	  
std.	  error	   0,000442	   0,000471	   0,000794	   0,000052	   0,000073	   0,000123	  
*	  statistically	  significant	  results	  (p < .005) 
 
The relationship (after including the GDP variable) are even weaker, than in the 
earlier case. Equation (5) and (6) represent the relationship. The earlier (equation 5) 
calculates homicide rates, the latter (equations 6) kidnapping rates. 
 
 
   y6hom = 62,411 + 0,000151x1 - 0,000679x2 + uit  (5) 
    y23hom = αi + 0,000564x1 - 0,000073x2 + uit   (5) 
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   y6kid = αi + 0,000403x1 + 0,000603x2 + uit    (6) 
   y23kid = αi + 0,000099x1 - 0,000630x2 + uit   (6) 
 
Coefficients in equations above are even lower than in the models without GDP 
variable. In some cases they report negative values. Most coefficients for GDP 
variable were negative. This suggests that there may be a negative relationship 
between the dependent variable and GDP in most cases, i.e. an increase in GDP could 
be associated with a decrease in homicide rates.  
 
However the relationships is very weak. For example a unit decrease in the area under 
coca cultivation can be associated with a decrease by 0,000564 in homicide rate and a 
unit decrease of GDP per capita is associated with a 0,000073 increase in homicide 
rates considering all the regions. Corresponding results for kidnapping rate are 
0,000099 decrease of kidnapping rate with a unit decrease in the area under coca 
cultivation and by 0,000630 with a unit decrease of the GDP per capita. On the top of 
the weak relationship, not all the measured values were statistically significant. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The analysis tried to answer the research question: " can reduction in coca cultivation 
can be interpreted as successful in terms of stabilizing security situation in 
Colombia"? If the objective of coca reduction efforts was to lower the violence and 
improve the security situation, the effort has failed to do so.  
 
Decreasing levels of violence in Colombia are probably the result of a different effort 
or development not the effect of coca supply reduction. However, the analysis was 
based on a number of assumptions. Their violation could significantly threaten the 
results. The clandestine character of the cocaine industry can also pose a threat to the 
result, because the official data may be flawed. More data, in terms of precision as 
well as quantity, would enhance the validity of these findings.  
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For instance, the place of coca cultivation, cocaine production and violence may not 
be identical. If each of this activity is committed in different Colombian regions, 
results of this study could be significantly flawed. However, no data or research has 
been published to target this issue.  
 
In summary, the study does not support claims that violence could be brought down 
through eradication of coca fields, or by providing alternative development programs 
with an objective to lower the existing area of the coca fields and other supply 
reduction programmes. This study is not denying the relationship between drugs and 
violence; it rather questions the relationship between reduction of coca fields and 
violence. The link between coca and violence is very complex and more research will 
be needed to fully understand what measures work the best. 
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